Remember the Academy Award winning movie “Network”? In it, the fictional TV host Howard Beale became a ratings sensation by nightly exclaiming that he was “mad as hell and not going to take this anymore”.
Well here’s one renter who’s “mad as hell and not going to take this anymore.”
While millions of “homeowners” continue to abuse and destabilize the nation’s banking system by not making their monthly mortgage payments, renters like you and me stay current on our rent payments.
While millions of homeowners skate for months and even years without making mortgage payments and continue to live in their homes, try not paying your rent for even one month. You’d be thrown out on your ear in no time flat.
While homeowners claim to be victims of the banking system because the banks didn’t properly sign or can’t locate certain documents the basic facts remain. The banks lent them the money to buy their homes, the banks took a security interest in the property, the homeowner failed to fulfill their part of the bargain by making their monthly payments. Therefore, the banks are legally entitled to foreclose on the property and liquidate it to try to recover their investment.
Just as a renter faces eviction by not paying their rent, homeowners should face timely foreclosure for not making their mortgage payments. It’s a basic issue of fairness.
While I can feel sympathy for homeowners victimized by the current economic recession you have to remember that renters are feeling the same pinch. We’re all in the same boat.
Continuing to delay the foreclosure process by instituting foreclosure moratoriums helps no one. Let’s get these properties back on the market so credit worthy homeowners and, yes, renters can take advantage of lower home values.
Enough is enough. It’s time to end delinquent homeowners’ free rides.
Wednesday, October 20, 2010
Tuesday, September 28, 2010
"Tenant Traps"
Here's some words of rental wisdom from Janet Portman and Marcia Stewart, the authors of "Renter's Rights: The Basics."
Never agree to put up with a rental unit that lacks basic health and safety features such as heat, plumbing, hot water and weatherproofing.
Never push for repairs before figuring out whether it's a habitability problem or a minor repair.
Never delay in reporting major repair problems.
Never use a "big stick" (such as withholding rent) to prod a landlord into action without first telling them of the problem and giving them a reasonable time to fix it.
Never use a big stick if you are behind in the rent, have an unauthorized roommate, or are violating some other important tenant obligation.
Never make a big deal over a minor repair unless you are prepared for an uphill fight with your landlord.
You have a right to livable housing. It's called the landlord's "implied warranty of habiltability". This means your landlord has promised you a livable place simply by renting it to you.
Never agree to put up with a rental unit that lacks basic health and safety features such as heat, plumbing, hot water and weatherproofing.
Never push for repairs before figuring out whether it's a habitability problem or a minor repair.
Never delay in reporting major repair problems.
Never use a "big stick" (such as withholding rent) to prod a landlord into action without first telling them of the problem and giving them a reasonable time to fix it.
Never use a big stick if you are behind in the rent, have an unauthorized roommate, or are violating some other important tenant obligation.
Never make a big deal over a minor repair unless you are prepared for an uphill fight with your landlord.
You have a right to livable housing. It's called the landlord's "implied warranty of habiltability". This means your landlord has promised you a livable place simply by renting it to you.
Monday, August 23, 2010
One Couple's New American Dream - Rent Don't Buy
Check out this article which appeared on the website of National Public Radio.
Earlier this year, Mark and Joanne Cleaver faced a decision: buy or rent. In normal times, their decision would have been easy.
But these are not normal times.
"We would lose money if we bought now — even at today's market rates," Joanne says. "Frankly, condo prices would have to go down a good 30 percent more to overcome the negative effect of the transition and transaction cost."
Mark and Joanne sold their home in Milwaukee — a home they owned for 28 years — and moved to Chicago. The couple, both in their 50s, relocated for her job. And they decided to rent an apartment overlooking Lake Michigan.
"It was a tough decision," Mark says. "You have kind of the emotional baggage of wanting to continue to own a house — the 'American Dream' theory. The flip side of it is, you kind of get to give up the baggage of all the maintenance cost — and all the maintenance time that goes along with it."
"Utilities are included. Parking's included. I write my check, I'm done for the month. It's a wonderful feeling," Mark added.
"Our front porch collapsed on our Milwaukee house," Joanne adds. "It was, like, $22,000 to replace it, just to get back to having a front porch. That's a lot of money to get hit with just to be able to walk up to your house, your front door."
Mark says that when he writes his rent check every month, he thinks to himself, "This is worth every penny."
"It locks my cost in every month," he says. "I have no surprises. Utilities are included. Parking's included. I write my check, I'm done for the month. It's a wonderful feeling."
While the Cleavers are enjoying the conveniences of renting — a staffed pool, a workout room, maintenance workers — they still haven't ruled out buying again. "We'll continue to go to open houses and take a good look and see if there's something there that really absolutely hits on all those cylinders," Joanne says.
And so far the Cleavers say there is only one downside to renting: "We do miss the ability just to go out into a backyard and grill," Mark says.
But they say it's a compromise they're willing to make.
"And when winter comes, and I'm watching everyone else doing their snow shoveling and snow plowing," says Mark, "I'm going to be smiling."
Earlier this year, Mark and Joanne Cleaver faced a decision: buy or rent. In normal times, their decision would have been easy.
But these are not normal times.
"We would lose money if we bought now — even at today's market rates," Joanne says. "Frankly, condo prices would have to go down a good 30 percent more to overcome the negative effect of the transition and transaction cost."
Mark and Joanne sold their home in Milwaukee — a home they owned for 28 years — and moved to Chicago. The couple, both in their 50s, relocated for her job. And they decided to rent an apartment overlooking Lake Michigan.
"It was a tough decision," Mark says. "You have kind of the emotional baggage of wanting to continue to own a house — the 'American Dream' theory. The flip side of it is, you kind of get to give up the baggage of all the maintenance cost — and all the maintenance time that goes along with it."
"Utilities are included. Parking's included. I write my check, I'm done for the month. It's a wonderful feeling," Mark added.
"Our front porch collapsed on our Milwaukee house," Joanne adds. "It was, like, $22,000 to replace it, just to get back to having a front porch. That's a lot of money to get hit with just to be able to walk up to your house, your front door."
Mark says that when he writes his rent check every month, he thinks to himself, "This is worth every penny."
"It locks my cost in every month," he says. "I have no surprises. Utilities are included. Parking's included. I write my check, I'm done for the month. It's a wonderful feeling."
While the Cleavers are enjoying the conveniences of renting — a staffed pool, a workout room, maintenance workers — they still haven't ruled out buying again. "We'll continue to go to open houses and take a good look and see if there's something there that really absolutely hits on all those cylinders," Joanne says.
And so far the Cleavers say there is only one downside to renting: "We do miss the ability just to go out into a backyard and grill," Mark says.
But they say it's a compromise they're willing to make.
"And when winter comes, and I'm watching everyone else doing their snow shoveling and snow plowing," says Mark, "I'm going to be smiling."
Monday, August 9, 2010
Housing Policy's Third Rail
The New York Time's Gretchen Morgenson offered up some excellent points regarding the apparent shift in U.S. housing policy away from home ownership. Our thanks to her for the heads up.
While Congress toiled on the financial overhaul last spring, precious little was said about Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the mortgage finance companies that collapsed spectacularly two years ago.
Indeed, these wards of the state got just two mentions in the 1,500-page law known as Dodd-Frank: first, when it ordered the Treasury to produce a study on ending the taxpayer-owned status of the companies and, second, in a “sense of the Congress” passage stating that efforts to improve the nation’s mortgage credit system “would be incomplete without enactment of meaningful structural reforms” of Fannie and Freddie.
With midterm elections near, though, there will be talk aplenty about dealing with the companies precisely because Dodd-Frank didn’t address them. Unfortunately, if past is prologue, this talk is likely to be more political than practical.
Fannie and Freddie amplified the housing boom by buying mortgages from lenders, allowing them to originate even more loans. They grew into behemoths because they lobbied aggressively and played the Washington political game to a T. But after both companies bought boatloads of risky mortgages, they required a federal rescue.
The Treasury’s study on Fannie, Freddie and housing finance must be delivered to Congress by the end of January 2011. In a speech last week, Timothy F. Geithner, the Treasury secretary, told a New York audience that resolving the companies isn’t “rocket science.”
But attaining genuine remedies for our housing finance system could actually be harder than rocket science. That’s because it would require an honest dialogue about the role the federal government should play in housing. It also requires a candid conversation about whether promoting homeownership through tax policy and other federal efforts remains a good idea, given the economic disaster we’ve just lived through.
Alas, honest dialogues on third-rail topics like housing have proved to be a bridge too far for many in Washington. So, what we may hear instead about Fannie and Freddie before the elections is a lot of sound and fury signifying a stealthy return to the status quo.
This would be unfortunate, not only because the financial crisis presents a rare opportunity to reassess the supposed benefits of homeownership but also because there was a lot not to like about the way these companies operated and the ways their friends in Congress enabled that behavior.
Outwardly, Fannie and Freddie wrapped themselves in the American flag and the dream of homeownership. But internally, they were relentless in their pursuit of profits from partners in the mortgage boom. One of their biggest and most steadfast collaborators was Countrywide, the subprime lending machine run by Angelo R. Mozilo.
Countrywide was the biggest supplier of loans to Fannie during the mania; in 2004, it sold 26 percent of the loans Fannie bought. Three years later, it was selling 28 percent. What Countrywide got out of the relationship was clear — a buyer for its dubious loans. Now the taxpayer is on the hook for those losses.
An internal Fannie document from 2004 obtained by The New York Times sheds light on this question. A “Customer Engagement Plan” for Countrywide, it shows how assiduously Fannie pursued Mr. Mozilo and 14 of his lieutenants to make sure the company continued to shovel loans its way.
Nine bullet points fall under the heading “Fannie Mae’s Top Strategic Business Objectives With Lender.” The first: “Deepen relationship at all levels throughout CHL and Fannie Mae to foster alignment and collaboration between our companies at every opportunity.” (CHL refers to Countrywide Home Loans.) No. 2: “Create barriers to exit partnership.” Next: “Disciplined Risk/Servicing Management” and “Achieve Fannie Mae Profitability Goals.”
(Later in 2004, by the way, the Securities and Exchange Commission found that Fannie had used improper accounting and ordered it to restate its earnings for the previous four years. Some $6.3 billion in profit was wiped out.)
The engagement plan also recommends ways that Fannie executives should mingle with Countrywide’s top management, because “fostering more direct senior level engagements with key influencers throughout their organization will be beneficial in ensuring strategic alignment and building organizational loyalty.”
Recommendations included conferring with Mr. Mozilo at Habitat for Humanity golf tournaments and Mortgage Bankers Association conventions. Franklin D. Raines, then Fannie’s C.E.O., and Daniel H. Mudd, then its chief operating officer, were advised to see Mr. Mozilo twice a year. “We will be successful when Angelo influences the industry or his organization on our behalf,” the document says. Mr. Raines didn’t respond to e-mails requesting comment last Friday; he left Fannie in December 2004.
The memo advised pursuing other Countrywide executives: “Deep Rapport” should be the goal with David E. Sambol, the lender’s president, but because he did not “heavily attend outside events” Fannie executives should “look for opportunities for meetings” at Countrywide headquarters.
“We will be successful if we can foster ongoing communication channels that allow us to understand and leverage Sambol’s priorities and demonstrate our commitment to making him successful,” the memo stated. Mr. Sambol and Mr. Mozilo could not be reached for comment.
For his part, Mr. Mudd, now the chief executive of the Fortress Investment Group, said Fannie’s courting of Countrywide was not unusual. “We tried to build a program that was based on having multiple strong relationships with our main customers,” he said. “You want to be sure that the first call is not the last call, that a customer is not doing business with you anymore.”
But Representative Darrell Issa, a California Republican and ranking member on the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, says he has concerns about such mating dances.
“Lost in the debate over how best to legislate the aftermath of the financial crisis has been the necessity to conduct an inward examination of the too-cozy relationship between government enterprises and private industry,” Mr. Issa said. “The true nature of this strategic partnership between Countrywide and Fannie-Freddie should be exposed so we can measure the extent to which it fostered the conditions leading to the financial meltdown.”
Understanding how these companies operated is crucial if we want to avoid repeating the mistakes of our recent past. So, when you hear about Fannie and Freddie reform this fall, remember that we still don’t know the half of it.
While Congress toiled on the financial overhaul last spring, precious little was said about Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the mortgage finance companies that collapsed spectacularly two years ago.
Indeed, these wards of the state got just two mentions in the 1,500-page law known as Dodd-Frank: first, when it ordered the Treasury to produce a study on ending the taxpayer-owned status of the companies and, second, in a “sense of the Congress” passage stating that efforts to improve the nation’s mortgage credit system “would be incomplete without enactment of meaningful structural reforms” of Fannie and Freddie.
With midterm elections near, though, there will be talk aplenty about dealing with the companies precisely because Dodd-Frank didn’t address them. Unfortunately, if past is prologue, this talk is likely to be more political than practical.
Fannie and Freddie amplified the housing boom by buying mortgages from lenders, allowing them to originate even more loans. They grew into behemoths because they lobbied aggressively and played the Washington political game to a T. But after both companies bought boatloads of risky mortgages, they required a federal rescue.
The Treasury’s study on Fannie, Freddie and housing finance must be delivered to Congress by the end of January 2011. In a speech last week, Timothy F. Geithner, the Treasury secretary, told a New York audience that resolving the companies isn’t “rocket science.”
But attaining genuine remedies for our housing finance system could actually be harder than rocket science. That’s because it would require an honest dialogue about the role the federal government should play in housing. It also requires a candid conversation about whether promoting homeownership through tax policy and other federal efforts remains a good idea, given the economic disaster we’ve just lived through.
Alas, honest dialogues on third-rail topics like housing have proved to be a bridge too far for many in Washington. So, what we may hear instead about Fannie and Freddie before the elections is a lot of sound and fury signifying a stealthy return to the status quo.
This would be unfortunate, not only because the financial crisis presents a rare opportunity to reassess the supposed benefits of homeownership but also because there was a lot not to like about the way these companies operated and the ways their friends in Congress enabled that behavior.
Outwardly, Fannie and Freddie wrapped themselves in the American flag and the dream of homeownership. But internally, they were relentless in their pursuit of profits from partners in the mortgage boom. One of their biggest and most steadfast collaborators was Countrywide, the subprime lending machine run by Angelo R. Mozilo.
Countrywide was the biggest supplier of loans to Fannie during the mania; in 2004, it sold 26 percent of the loans Fannie bought. Three years later, it was selling 28 percent. What Countrywide got out of the relationship was clear — a buyer for its dubious loans. Now the taxpayer is on the hook for those losses.
An internal Fannie document from 2004 obtained by The New York Times sheds light on this question. A “Customer Engagement Plan” for Countrywide, it shows how assiduously Fannie pursued Mr. Mozilo and 14 of his lieutenants to make sure the company continued to shovel loans its way.
Nine bullet points fall under the heading “Fannie Mae’s Top Strategic Business Objectives With Lender.” The first: “Deepen relationship at all levels throughout CHL and Fannie Mae to foster alignment and collaboration between our companies at every opportunity.” (CHL refers to Countrywide Home Loans.) No. 2: “Create barriers to exit partnership.” Next: “Disciplined Risk/Servicing Management” and “Achieve Fannie Mae Profitability Goals.”
(Later in 2004, by the way, the Securities and Exchange Commission found that Fannie had used improper accounting and ordered it to restate its earnings for the previous four years. Some $6.3 billion in profit was wiped out.)
The engagement plan also recommends ways that Fannie executives should mingle with Countrywide’s top management, because “fostering more direct senior level engagements with key influencers throughout their organization will be beneficial in ensuring strategic alignment and building organizational loyalty.”
Recommendations included conferring with Mr. Mozilo at Habitat for Humanity golf tournaments and Mortgage Bankers Association conventions. Franklin D. Raines, then Fannie’s C.E.O., and Daniel H. Mudd, then its chief operating officer, were advised to see Mr. Mozilo twice a year. “We will be successful when Angelo influences the industry or his organization on our behalf,” the document says. Mr. Raines didn’t respond to e-mails requesting comment last Friday; he left Fannie in December 2004.
The memo advised pursuing other Countrywide executives: “Deep Rapport” should be the goal with David E. Sambol, the lender’s president, but because he did not “heavily attend outside events” Fannie executives should “look for opportunities for meetings” at Countrywide headquarters.
“We will be successful if we can foster ongoing communication channels that allow us to understand and leverage Sambol’s priorities and demonstrate our commitment to making him successful,” the memo stated. Mr. Sambol and Mr. Mozilo could not be reached for comment.
For his part, Mr. Mudd, now the chief executive of the Fortress Investment Group, said Fannie’s courting of Countrywide was not unusual. “We tried to build a program that was based on having multiple strong relationships with our main customers,” he said. “You want to be sure that the first call is not the last call, that a customer is not doing business with you anymore.”
But Representative Darrell Issa, a California Republican and ranking member on the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, says he has concerns about such mating dances.
“Lost in the debate over how best to legislate the aftermath of the financial crisis has been the necessity to conduct an inward examination of the too-cozy relationship between government enterprises and private industry,” Mr. Issa said. “The true nature of this strategic partnership between Countrywide and Fannie-Freddie should be exposed so we can measure the extent to which it fostered the conditions leading to the financial meltdown.”
Understanding how these companies operated is crucial if we want to avoid repeating the mistakes of our recent past. So, when you hear about Fannie and Freddie reform this fall, remember that we still don’t know the half of it.
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